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1 Introduction
The purpose of active labour market policy (ALMP) in Germany is the permanent integration of
unemployed individuals into regular employment. Several types of programmes are accomplished
by the Federal Employment Agency (FEA) which aim e.g. at human capital transfer, qualification,
social stabilisation and an increase of the individual mobility. Although substantial amounts of the
budget have been spent on these programmes in recent years, their success has been questioned, since
unemployment in Germany is still rising. Job creation schemes (JCS) have been the second most
important ALMP programme after vocational training in the late 1990s and early 2000s in terms
of promoted individuals and spendings. The measures are some form of subsidised employment for
unemployed persons with disadvantages on the labour market and aim at the stabilisation and quali-
fication of these individuals. Programmes have to be of value for the society and additional in nature
which means that only activities are promoted which could not be executed without the subsidy.
Even though this is understandable in order to avoid substitution effects, it is also a drawback since
the occupations are not allowed to offer experiences which are comparable to regular employment.
Additional criticism regarding JCS arises because they lack explicit qualificational elements leading
e.g. to a formal degree. Therefore, their value in terms of increasing the re-integration of unemployed
persons into regular employment has to be evaluated thoroughly. In a previous study (see Caliendo,
Hujer, and Thomsen (2005a)) we have focussed on group-specific and regional effect heterogeneity
and the results have shown that the average effects for the participating individuals are disappointing.
For most of the groups the effects are insignificant and for some groups the effects were negative.
Only one group (long-term unemployed) benefited from participation.
In this paper we explicitly focus on effect heterogeneity caused by differences in the implementa-
tion of programmes. By doing so we want to identify possible sources causing good (or bad) effects,
helping to improve the design and implementation of programmes in the future. JCS can be car-
2
ried out by different implementing institutions from the public and the non-commercial sector
as well as by private businesses. The measures include jobs in nine different economic sectors, like
agriculture, construction and industry or office and services. Furthermore, they may
differ with respect to the type of support (regular vs. enforced promotion). In this paper we
evaluate the effects for the participating individuals with respect to these three possible sources of
effect heterogeneity. Our empirical analysis is based on administrative information of the FEA on all
participants who have started a JCS in February 2000. Additionally we have a sample of unemployed
persons who were eligible in January 2000 but did not participate in February. The ratio between
treated individuals and untreated individuals is approximately 1:20.
The effects of JCS with respect to programme heterogeneity has been analysed already in Hujer,
Caliendo, and Thomsen (2004). We extend these results in three important directions. First, we are
able to use regular (unsubsidised) employment as an outcome variable. In our former analysis we
were only able to estimate the individual effects in terms of not being unemployed or job-seeking,
which is clearly less informative. Second, we also extend our observation period until December
2002. For that reason, we are able to evaluate the programme effects up to almost three years after
programmes have started, and to provide implications about the effects in the mid run. Third, we
evaluate the effects with respect to the type of promotion and the implementing institution. As a
place in enforced promotion is in general more expensive, it has to be asked whether the effects
justify the additional costs. The analysis of the effects with respect to the implementing institution
may help to identify efficiency differences between public and non-commercial providers.1
The paper is organised as follows: We start with some facts about job creation schemes in
Germany in the following section. After that, we present the dataset and describe the groups in
analysis with additional descriptive results in section three. In section four we present and discuss
our evaluation approach and implement it in section five. The employment effects of job creation
1 Due to the small numbers of programmes supported in private businesses they had to be excluded from analysis.
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schemes with respect to the programme sectors, types of promotion and types of providers are
presented in section six. The final section concludes.
2 Some Facts about Job Creation Schemes in Germany
JCS have been the second most important programme of ALMP in Germany regarding the expenses
(3.68 billion Euro) and the number of entries (260,079 newly promoted individuals) at the begin of our
observation period in 2000 (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, 2002a). They can be promoted if they support
activities which are of value for the society and additional in nature.2 Additional in nature means
that the activities could not be executed without the subsidy. For that reason, the majority of JCS is
conducted by public and non-commercial institutions, although support can also be obtained by
private businesses. However, some special clauses to prevent substitution effects and windfall gains
have to be regarded. Besides the social value and the additional benefit of the activities, participants
in JCS in the private sector have to be from special target groups of the labour market, e.g. young
unemployed without professional training, and get educational supervision during occupations.
JCS should be offered to individuals whose last chance to stabilise and qualify for later re-
integration into regular employment is participation. Hence, JCS are primarily targeted at specific
problem groups of the labour market, like long-term unemployed or persons without work experience
or professional training.
Financial support for JCS is obtained as a wage subsidy to the implementing institution. JCS in
the public sector are conducted by the administration departments of municipalities and towns, of
administrative districts, of the Federal Authority, of churches and of universities. Non-commercial
entities are mainly friendly societies, charities and non-profit enterprises. The FEA distinguishes
nine different economic sectors for the implementation of programmes, like agriculture or con-
2 The empirical analysis is based on programmes conducted during 2000 and 2001. As the legal basis has been
amended twice (2002/2004), we refer to §§ 260-271, 416 of Social Code III before 2002.
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struction and industry.3 Since the categorisation of the sectors was set up in the mid 1980s,
the changes due to the German Re-Unification and the further labour market reforms in the 1990s
and 2000s are not reflected. Due to this, several sectors are nowadays only of minor importance. A
further distinction can be made regarding the type of promotion, that is regular or enforced.
Enforced promotion should be granted for projects which enhance the chances for permanent jobs,
support structural improvement in social or environmental services or aim at the integration of ex-
tremely hard-to-place individuals. In general, JCS should be co-financed measures where between
30% and 75% of the costs are subsidies by the FEA and the rest is paid by the provider and the
subsidy is normally paid for 12 months. However, exceptions can be made in the direction of a
higher subsidy-quota (up to 100%) and programmes can be extended up to 24 or even 36 months, if
the JCS create the preconditions for permanent jobs, provide jobs for unemployed individuals with
strong labour market disadvantages or improve social infrastructure or environment.
Potential participants have to be long-term unemployed (more than one year) or unemployed for
at least six months within the last twelve months and have to be eligible for unemployment compen-
sation. In addition, the local placement officers are allowed to place up to five percent of the allocated
individuals who do not meet these conditions (‘Five-Percent-Quota’). Further exceptions are made
for young unemployed (under 25 years) without professional training, short-term unemployed (with
at least three months of unemployment) placed as tutors, and disabled who could be stabilised or
qualified.
A further important point to mention is how selection into programmes is accomplished, i.e. why
do certain unemployed persons participate while others do not. This is also of particular interest for
the choice of the comparison group. Participation in JCS results from placement by the caseworker.
The unemployed individual is offered a specific job in one sector where a place is available and which
3 The sectors are agriculture, coast protection and land reclamation, forestry, transportation, construction and
industry, supply facilities, office and services, community services, and other.
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fits her characteristics as assessed by the caseworker in cooperation with the potential participant.
Thus, assignment to programmes depends on the one hand on the assessment of the individual’s need
of assistance by the local labour office, and on the other hand on the availability of jobs in JCS at a
specific point of time. The responsible caseworker can cancel the programme before the regular end
if the participating individual can be placed in the first labour market. If an unemployed rejects a
programme offer for the first time, the labour office can stop the UI benefits for up to twelve months,
in case of repeated rejection the unemployed persons may lose their UI entitlement.
3 Dataset, Groups of Analysis and Selected Descriptives
3.1 Dataset
Our dataset is constructed from four administrative sources of the FEA. To describe the individual
situation in the labour market for participants and nonparticipants, we use information from the
job-seekers data base (Bewerberangebotsdatei, BewA) and an adjusted version for statistical pur-
poses (ST4). They contain information on all unemployed individuals and individuals threatened by
unemployment registered at the labour offices. The datasets provide each individual’s unemployment
status information together with important information on the job-seekers socio-demographic situa-
tion, qualification details and labour market history. This information is amended by attributes of
subsidised employment programmes (ST11) as for example the economic sector, or the programme
duration. These three sources build up a prototype version of the programme participants master
data set (Maßnahme-Teilnehmer-Gesamtdatei, MTG).4 For this reason, the MTG contains numerous
attributes to describe individual aspects on the one hand, and provides a reasonable basis for the
construction of the comparison group on the other hand.
As the local labour market environment is an important determinant of programme assignment
and impacts, we complete our set of attributes by regional dummies according to the classification
4 The final version of the MTG contains information on all ALMP programmes of the FEA, but was not available
when the samples were drawn.
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of similar and comparable labour office districts by the FEA (see Blien et al. (2004)). This classifi-
cation categorises the 181 German labour office districts into twelve comparable clusters which can
be condensed into five types for strategic purposes. The comparability of the labour office districts
is built upon several labour market characteristics. The most important criteria are the underem-
ployment quota and the corrected population density (see Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2005b)
for further details). Because all East German labour office districts (except the city of Dresden)
belong to the first cluster, we use the finer classification (Clusters Ia to II) for the East, whereas for
West Germany we rely on the coarser one (II to V). The clusters are in order of the labour market
prospects described starting with the worst labour market environment (Ia).
For the construction of the outcome variable of interest (regular and unsubsidised employment)
we use a fourth source, namely the Employment Statistics Register (Bescha¨ftigtenstatistik, BSt).
The BSt includes information on all persons registered in the social security system (employees and
participants of several ALMP programmes). As we define only regular employment as a success5, we
have to identify spells of regular employment without further promotion. To do so, we amend the
outcome variable by excerpted information of the final version of the MTG on the individual’s time
spent in ALMP programmes.
Our empirical analysis is based on a cross-section of participants in JCS who have started their
programmes in February 2000. Since participants and nonparticipants have to be homogeneous
in the basic characteristics which determine eligibility to the programme under examination, the
comparison group is drawn as a random sample of unemployed job-seekers from January 2000. By
doing so, we ensured that the nonparticipants were eligible for participation in February 2000, but
did not participate in that month. Due to a clearly different situation of the German labour market in
East and West Germany, we separate our analysis with respect to these regions. Regarding previous
empirical findings (Hujer, Caliendo, and Thomsen, 2004) we separate the analysis additionally by
5 All other kinds of subsidised employment or participation in ALMP programmes are defined as a failure.
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gender. Furthermore, we excluded the local labour market of Berlin from the analysis. The special
situation of the capital city would require a separate evaluation of the effects. However, the small
number of participants aggravates the interpretation of the results. Our final sample contains 11,151
participants and 219,622 nonparticipants for whom we observe the employment status until December
2002 which is almost three years after programmes have started.
3.2 Groups of Analysis
Although the FEA distinguishes nine different sectors for the implementation of JCS, there are only
four sectors of major importance: Agriculture, Construction and Industry, Office and
Services and Community Services. As the sectors Coast Protection and Land Reclama-
tion, Forestry, Transportation and Supply Facilities are only of minor importance, they are
summarised and added to the category Other, leaving us with five sectors for analysis. Figure 1
presents the number of participants in these sectors in West and East Germany. To allow a reasonable
estimation and interpretation of treatment effects, groups with less than 100 participants are excluded
from analysis. This is relevant for women in West Germany participating either in the sectors Agri-
culture (41) or Construction and Industry (36). Leaving participants in the sector Other
apart, the majority of men in both regions participate in sectors Agriculture (584 participants in
West Germany / 925 in East Germany) and Construction and Industry (317/416). The largest
share of female participants in both parts can be found in the sector Community Services with
503 participants in West Germany and 1,810 participants in East Germany. The smallest share of
participants is employed in Office and Services’ occupations. On the one hand this may be due
to specific abilities needed for these kind of jobs, which most of the participants may not have. On
the other hand, this may also be caused by the fact that occupations in this sector are not additional
in nature and of value for the society. Since these are the preconditions for a promotion of JCS (see
section 2) this would explain the relatively low share of participants in this sector. This first glance
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already shows significant differences in the allocation to the different sectors not only between the
regions but also between men and women.
Fig. 1: Number of Participants in the Programme Sectors
Figure 2 additionally differentiates the number of participants in the different sectors by type
of promotion and provider. Comparing the shares of participants with regular and enforced promo-
tion (left hand side of the figure) shows notable differences between East and West Germany and
reflects the worse labour market situation in East Germany. While in West Germany the majority
of programmes (over 70%) is implemented as regular promotion, in East Germany the picture is
inverted. Here, 68% of the men and 53% of the women are in enforced promotion. Since the major
difference between the two types of promotion is a higher subsidy to the implementing institution,
it is not surprising that JCS are on average more expensive in East Germany. While the average
monthly costs per participant have been 1,419 Euro in West Germany, 1,518 Euro have been spent
on average per participant in East Germany in the year 2001 (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, 2002b).
The share of regular promotion is highest in the sectors Office and Services and Community
Services. In West Germany over 96% of the male participants in the first sector receive regular
promotion and 90% of the women. In Community Services the numbers are 69% for men and
74% for women. In East Germany the share of participants with regular promotion is much lower
than in West Germany (55% / 62% of the men / women in Office and Services, 61% / 60% in
9
Community Services) but still much higher when compared to the other sectors.
Fig. 2: Number of Participants in the Sectors (by type of promotion and provider) a,b
a Left side shows the number of participants in the sectors differentiated by type of promotion (regular and enforced).
b Right side shows the number of participants in the sectors differentiated by provider (public sector or non-commercial
institution, participants in private sector in brackets).
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The graphs on the right side of figure 2 present the number of participants differentiated by
providers of jobs. Due to the legal requirements of JCS (see section 2), support of programmes
in private businesses is only rarely granted (number in brackets). This leads to the fact that the
largest group of participants in private businesses are women in the sector Other in East Germany
(81), and the smallest group are two male participants in the sector Office and Services in
West Germany. Hence, we do not analyse the employment effects of this provider and exclude the
concerned individuals from analysis.
What becomes obvious from the graphs is, that JCS are mainly accomplished by non-commercial
entities, like friendly societies, charities and non-profit enterprises. Although institutions from the
public sector, e.g. adminstration departments of municipalities and towns, also provide a sub-
stantial number of occupations, they only dominate the schemes in Agriculture for men in West
Germany. The dominance of non-commercial entities is not surprising, since JCS should stabilise
and qualify hard-to-place individuals for later re-integration into regular employment by providing
temporary occupations that do not compete with regular jobs. Those regulations are in order to
avoid substitution effect and windfall gains and can most likely be met by non-commercial institu-
tions, which have a sufficient demand for workers, do not compete with private businesses and could
not provide long-run opportunities for comparable employees without the subsidy.
Let us summarise so far. The occupations between the sectors differ and there are also differ-
ences in the implementation of schemes between the two types of providers. Finally, the type of
promotion is not homogenous, either, and we expect the employment effects to be heterogeneous,
too. The direction of the effect heterogeneity is not clear a-priori. We have discussed already that the
occupations in the different sectors differ and also require different abilities from the participants.
However, it is a-priori unclear which type of occupation will improve the employment chances of
individuals more. The same is true regarding the providers. Finally, also with respect to the third
source of possible effect heterogeneity (the type of promotion) different arguments may be thought of.
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Since one reason for enforced promotion is a higher degree of ‘need of assistance’, it can be argued
that this type should lead to better outcomes, as the costs are usually higher and the programme
is more intense. On the other hand, it may also be claimed that those individuals have on average
worse labour market prospects. Clearly, these presumptions can be confirmed or discarded only by
empirical examination.
3.3 Selected Descriptives
Let us briefly consider the different characteristics of participants in the five sectors and compare them
with the group of nonparticipants. Tables A.1 to A.4 in the appendix present means and frequencies of
relevant variables with differentiation by gender, region and sector. The attributes are categorised into
four types: socio-demographic information, qualification details, labour market history and regional
context. In addition, the average programme duration within the sectors is added. With respect to
this information, some notable differences are visible. Whereas men in West Germany experience
the shortest programmes on average in the sector Agriculture with 262 days, their counterparts
in this sector in East Germany leave programmes on average after 325 days, i.e. approximately two
months later. As already noted, only a small fraction of male participants is employed in Office
and Services. Furthermore, the programmes in this sector last the longest time (337 days in West
Germany/ 332 in East Germany). Unfortunately, our data lacks information about the reasons for
the different durations. We are unable to identify whether programme duration is determined by
the planning of the caseworkers in the first place (nominal duration), or whether better alternatives
for the participating individuals are obtained during programmes (realised duration). For women in
East Germany, the average programme duration differs between sectors, too. The participants in
Construction and Industry leave the programmes on average after 290 days, whereas women
in Other stay in programmes for nearly 341 days. In contrast to that, programme durations for
women in West Germany vary hardly. Women in West Germany remain in programmes between 305
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days (Community Services) and 311 days (Other). Apart from these sectoral differences, it has
to be mentioned that participants in West Germany remain in programmes on average shorter than
in East Germany (independently of gender). That may be on the one hand due to better alternatives
on the labour market, e.g. regular job opportunities or other ALMP programmes, or on the other
hand due to a different acknowledgement of programmes by the participants.
Let us now compare some selected characteristics of participants and nonparticipants in the dif-
ferent sectors. A first thing to note is that male participants in West Germany are significantly older
than nonparticipants who are on average 43.2 years in January 2000. It can also be seen, that the
age of participants varies considerably between the sectors. Whereas men in Construction and
Industry and Community Services are at the begin of programmes on average about 35 years
old, participants in Agriculture are already 39 and in Office and Services even about 43 which
almost equals the age of nonparticipants. Looking at the results for women in West Germany shows a
similar picture. Again nonparticipants are on average older (43.3 years) than the participants, inde-
pendently of sectors. In contrast to that, the results for men in East Germany show quite a different
picture. Participants are on average clearly older than the nonparticipants. The youngest partici-
pants (approximately 43 years) are employed in Community Services and Construction and
Industry, the oldest in Agriculture (46 years) and Office and Services (49 years), whereas
the nonparticipants are on average 41.7 years. Women in East Germany are the most homogeneous
group with respect to the age of participants and nonparticipants. Age varies slightly between 43
years (Construction and Industry, Agriculture andOther) and 45 years (Office and Ser-
vices) for participants and is on average 44 years for nonparticipants. Except for women in West
Germany, participants in Office and Services are the oldest of all sectors. Although the individ-
ual’s age may be expected to be an important determinant for a possible re-integration into regular
employment and therefore shorter programme duration, this expectation is only partly affirmed by
the results. There is a tendency that programmes last on average longer if participants are older, but
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no clear pattern can be revealed. With respect to health restrictions, we find that men without health
restrictions are over-represented in the sectors Agriculture and Construction and Industry
when compared to nonparticipants. This is intuitively understandable since occupations in these
sectors may involve some form of manual labour. The same findings emerge for men and women in
East Germany.
It is quite interesting to look at the professional training of individuals in the different sectors. Par-
ticipants without completed professional training are over-represented in the sectors Agriculture
and Construction and Industry, whereas individuals with higher degrees are over-represented
in the sectors Office and Services and Community Services. Both points are true irrespec-
tive of gender and region, even though the first point is more pronounced in West-Germany. We
have mentioned already in the descriptive analysis in the last chapter, that the share of individuals
without any professional training (and without certificate for secondary education) is rather low in
East Germany. Most of the individuals here have at least some formal degree (‘industrial training’).
Clearly, this has also to be seen in relation to the higher age of participants in East Germany. The
professional rank points in the same direction. Men in West Germany who are white-collar work-
ers are over-represented in the Office and Services sector and unskilled workers are primarily
found in Agriculture or Construction and Industry. White-collar females in West Germany
are remarkably over-represented in Office and Services and Community Services. Taking to-
gether, this shows that higher qualified persons are more likely to be found in the sectors Office
and Services and Community Services, whereas low-qualified individuals are more likely to be
in Agriculture or Construction and Industry. It is quite interesting to note that nonpartici-
pants in West Germany have on average more work experience when compared to the participants.
In East Germany on the other hand the situation is much more balanced and no large differences in
work experience between participants and nonparticipants are visible.
These findings confirm two expectations. First, participants and nonparticipants differ remark-
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ably in their characteristics. Clearly, this has been expected and highlights once again that a simple
comparison of treated and non-treated individuals will lead to selection bias. We will address this
problem in the next section. Second, the participants in the different sectors have also rather different
characteristics, and the estimation has to take this into account properly.
4 Choosing the Right Evaluation Approach
4.1 The Potential Outcome Framework and Selection Bias
The standard framework to think about treatment effects in the microeconometric literature is the
potential outcome approach or Roy (1951)-Rubin (1974) model. In this framework an individual
can choose between two states, e.g. either participating in a certain labour market programme or
not. The individual then has two potential outcomes, where Y 1 denotes the outcome with treatment
and Y 0 the outcome without treatment. The actually observed outcome for any individual i can be
written as: Yi = Y 1i · Di + (1 − Di) · Y 0i , where D ∈ {0, 1} is a binary treatment indicator. The
treatment effect for each individual i is then defined as the difference between her potential outcomes
∆i = Y 1i − Y 0i . Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) generalise this approach for situations where a
whole range of treatments is available. However, as we are only interested in the pairwise comparison
of a particular treatment to non-participation, we can constrict our description to the binary case.
The parameter of interest is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), defined as:
ATT = E(∆ | D = 1) = E(Y 1 | D = 1)− E(Y 0 | D = 1). (1)
The second term on the right hand side of equation (1) is unobservable as it describes the hypothetical
outcome without treatment for those individuals who received treatment. As we work with non-
experimental data, estimating the ATT by the difference in the subpopulation means of participants
E(Y 1 | D = 1) and nonparticipants E(Y 0 | D = 0) will lead to a selection bias, since participants
and nonparticipants are selected groups that would have different outcomes even in absence of the
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programme. Depending on the data at hand, different evaluation strategies can be thought of (see
e.g. the overviews from Blundell and Costa-Dias (2002) or Caliendo and Hujer (2005)). Basically, two
categories of estimators can be distinguished. The first category of estimators relies on the so-called
conditional independence assumption (CIA). The basic idea here is, that the potential outcomes Y
are independent of participation D if we condition on covariates X. In fact, we need to observe all
covariates that jointly influence the selection into treatment and the outcome on the labour market.
Estimators that exploit the CIA are e.g. matching and regression models. If one believes that the
available data is not rich enough to justify this assumption, he has to rely on the second category
of estimators which explicitly allows selection on unobservables, too, like instrumental variables and
selection models. Clearly, the CIA is in general a very strong assumption. Blundell, Dearden, and
Sianesi (2004) argue that the plausibility of such an assumption should always be discussed on a
case-by-case basis, thereby taking account of the informational richness of the data. Hence, we will
do so in the following subsection.
4.2 Plausibility of the CIA
Clearly, a first thing to do is to look at the institutional set-up and the selection process into JCS
as discussed in section 2. As we have seen, JCS are in general open to all unemployed persons who
meet the eligibility criteria. However, assignment to programmes depends also on the individual’s
need of assistance (as evaluated by the caseworker). As we can access very rich and informative
data from administrative sources, we are able to considerably approximate this need of assistance.
To do so, we categorise the attributes into four classes. The first class contains socio-demographic
variables which are important determinants of the labour market prospects, like age, marital status,
number of children, nationality (German or foreigner), and health restrictions. The second class
refers to the human capital of the individual (qualification variables). The attributes included cover
the professional training, the occupational group, the professional rank and the work experience
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of the individual. As the third class we define career variables, describing the individual’s labour
market history like the duration of the last employment, the duration of unemployment at the end of
January 2000, the number of (successless) placement propositions, the last contact to the job center,
whether the individual aspires for vocational rehabilitation, and a former programme participation.
Additionally we have an assessment by the caseworker if the individual has placement restraints due
to health restrictions. Finally, the last class of attributes enfolds the regional context as described
above. Given this informative set of variables we henceforth argue that the CIA holds.
Choosing a proper control group is the next thing to do. Although participation in ALMP
programmes is not mandatory in Germany, the majority of unemployed persons join a programme
after some time. Thus, comparing participants to individuals who will never participate is inadequate,
since is can be assumed that the latter group is particularly selective. Sianesi (2004) discusses this
problem for Sweden and argues that these persons are the ones who do not enter a programme
because they have found a job already. Therefore, we restrict our comparison group only to be
unemployed and eligible at the end of January 2000 and not to participate in February 2000. The
ratio of participants to potential non-participants in our data is 1:20.
4.3 Estimating Treatment Effects with Matching Estimators
Given the CIA holds and that we access to a large group of eligible nonparticipants, the matching
estimator is an appealing choice. As already said, it is based on the identifying assumption that,
conditional on some covariate X, the outcome Y is independent of D. It is well known that matching
on X can become impossible when X is of high dimension (‘curse of dimensionality’). To deal
with this dimensionality problem, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) suggest the use of balancing scores
b(X), i.e. functions of the relevant observed covariates X such that the conditional distribution of
X given b(X) is independent of the assignment to treatment, that is X qD|b(X). For participants
and nonparticipants with the same balancing score, the distributions of the covariates X are the
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same, i.e. they are balanced across the groups. The propensity score P (X), i.e. the probability of
participating in a programme is one possible balancing score, which summarises the information of
the observed covariates X into a single index function. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show that if
treatment assignment is strongly ignorable given X, it is also strongly ignorable given any balancing
score. Hence, it is sufficient to assume that: Y 0 q D|P (X), where q denotes independence. In
order to find comparable non-treated individuals for all treated observations it is usually additionally
assumed that Pr(D = 1 | X) < 1, for all X.
Several matching procedures have been suggested.6 The choice of the matching method involves a
trade-off between matching quality and variance. First, one has to decide on how many non-treated
individuals to match to a single treated individual. Nearest-neighbour (NN) matching only uses
the participant and its closest neighbour. Therefore it minimises the bias but may also involve an
efficiency loss, since a large number of close neigbours are disregarded. Kernel-based matching on
the other hand uses more nonparticipants for each participant thereby reducing the variance but
possibly increasing the bias. Finally, using the same non-treated individual more than once (NN
matching with replacement) can possibly improve the matching quality, but increases the variance.
We tested the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the algorithm choice in our companion
paper (Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen, 2005a). It turns out that the results are not sensitive and
that nearest-neighbour (NN) matching with an additional caliper of 0.02 is the most favourable choice.
Caliper matching can be seen as a variant of NN matching that chooses the closest neighbour in terms
of the propensity score only if the difference between the scores of participant and nonparticipant does
not exceed a certain threshold value, in our case 0.02.7 Given the large sample of nonparticipants we
additionally match ‘without replacement’.
6 Good overviews can be found in Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd (1998) and Smith and Todd (2005).
7 Matching has been implemented using the Stata module psmatch2 by Leuven and Sianesi (2003).
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5 Implementing Propensity Score Matching
5.1 Propensity Score Estimation
As we want to evaluate the impacts of participation in JCS in a specific economic sector, with a
specific type of promotion, and with respect to the supporting institution, we have to take account
for differences regarding the assignment to programmes. For example, it has become obvious from
the findings in section 3.3 that higher qualified individuals are more likely to be found in the sectors
Office and Services and Community Services, whereas lower-qualified ones are more likely to
be in Agriculture or Construction and Industry. Hence, it can be expected that the attribute
‘professional training’ has a different influence on the participation probability in the different sectors.
Thus, we estimate the propensity scores separately for every treatment group in analysis against the
group of nonparticipants. To do so, we use binary logit models.8 To abbreviate documentation of
the propensity score estimations, we only discuss the results for the five sectors in the following.9
The results for the propensity score estimations for the five sectors can be found in tables A.5
(Men, West Germany), A.6 (Women, West Germany), A.7 (Men, East Germany) and A.8 (Women,
East Germany) in the appendix. A first thing which becomes obvious is that the parameters of
the choice estimations do not only diverge with respect to regional and gender-specific differences,
but also with respect to sector specific aspects. Clearly, this has been expected based on the de-
scriptive analysis. For example, married men (0.6680) and women (0.1677) in West Germany have
a higher probability to join a programme in the sector Community Services than men (-0.2582/
insignificant) and women (-0.4877) in the East. A good example for sector-specific differences is the
individuals’ age. Whereas age has a negative impact on the probability for men in West Germany
8 As we exclude groups of less than 100 participating individuals, we estimate 18 logit models for the five sectors,
29 logit models for the five sectors with respect to the type of promotion, and 26 logit models for the five sectors with
respect to the type of provider. For all groups in consideration we estimate the models with respect to region and
gender separately.
9 The results of the estimations for the other groups (type of promotion, type of provider) are available on request
by the authors.
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to join Construction and Industry (-0.1343), it has a positive effect for them to join Office
and Services (0.3791). Clearly, there are also variables that influence participation probabilities
irrespective of gender and region. The number of placement propositions is a fine example as it
increases the participation probabilities for men and women in both parts and all sectors. There is
a strong tendency for men and women with health restrictions to participate in the sectors Office
and Services or Community Services when compared to individuals without health restrictions.
This makes sense as it is not very likely for people with health problems to work in the sectors
Agriculture or Construction and Industry. People with higher qualifications (reference cat-
egory is without completed professional training and CSE) tend to go in the sectors Office and
Services and Community Services, too. For example the coefficient for West German men with
college or university degree to join the sector Office and Services is 1.5608, whereas this char-
acteristic reduces the probability to join Agriculture by a coefficient of -1.2767. The influence of
professional rank works in the same direction. Individuals with a higher rank (compared to unskilled
workers) are less likely to participate in Agriculture (and to a certain extent also Construction
and Industry). The coefficients for the occupational groups are as expected. People who come
from service professions are also more likely to join sectors Office and Services and Commu-
nity Services and less likely to join Agriculture and Construction and Industry. No clear
differences between the sectors can be found for the unemployment duration and the duration of
last employment. The latter one decreases the participation probability for all groups in all sectors.
The unemployment duration (in three classes: less than 13 weeks (reference), 13-52 weeks and over
52 weeks) has significant influence mainly in East Germany, where it increases the probability for
nearly all sectors. Overall it can be stated that sector-specific differences play a major role for the
participation probabilities.
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5.2 Matching Quality and Common Support
Based upon the propensity score estimates and the chosen matching algorithm, we check the matching
quality by comparing the standardised bias (SB) before and after matching. Since we do not condition
on all the covariates but on the propensity scores, this is a necessary step to see if the matching
procedure is able to balance the distribution of the covariates between the group of participants and
nonparticipants.10 The SB, as suggested by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985), assesses the distance in
the marginal distributions of the X-variables. For each covariate X it is defined as the difference
of the sample means in the treated and (matched) comparison sub-samples as a percentage of the
square root of the average of the sample variances in both groups. The SB before and after matching
is given by:
SB = 100 · (X1t −X0t)√
0.5 · (V1t(X) + V0t(X))
, with t ∈ (0, 1). (2)
X1 (V1) is the mean (variance) in the treated group and X0 (V0) the analogue for the comparison
group before matching if t = 0, and the corresponding values after matching if t = 1. For the sake
of brevity, we calculated the means of the SB before and after matching for men and women in
West and East Germany for the different treatments in consideration as an unweighted average of
all variables (mean standardised bias, MSB):
MSB =
1
K
K∑
k=1
100 · Xk1t −Xk0t[√(Vk1t(X) + Vk0t(X))/2]
 , (3)
with K denoting the number of covariates. The results can be found in table 1.
Starting with the results for the five sectors, for men in West Germany we see that the overall bias
before matching is between 14.77% (Other) and 23.23% (Office and Services). The matching
procedure is able to achieve a significant reduction in all of the sectors and leads to a MSB after
matching between 3.42% and 4.33% for four of the five sectors. The MSB after matching in the sector
10 See Caliendo (2005) for an exhaustive discussion on how to implement propensity score matching and to test
matching quality and common support.
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Office and Services is still quite high (6.86%). But taking into account that this group is the
smallest group of men in West Germany and the enormous reduction compared to the situation before
matching, this is acceptable. For women in West Germany, the MSB is reduced from 21.76% to 5.31%
in the sector Office and Services, from 18.11% to 3.07% in the sector Community Services
and from 15.83% to 5.01% in the sector Other. The bias reduction in East Germany is even
better, leaving us with a MSB after matching between 2.17% (Agriculture) and 5.72% (Office
and Services) for men and between 1.58% (Community Services) and 5.74% (Construction
and Industry) for women. Overall, these are enormous reductions and show that the matching
procedure is able to balance the characteristics in the treatment and the matched comparison group.
Tab. 1: Mean Standardised Bias Before and After Matching in
Programme Sectors1
All Promotion Provider
Individuals Regular Enforced Public Non-comm.
before after before after before after before after before after
West Germany
Men
Agriculture 18.88 3.76 19.56 4.33 19.81 5.88 19.07 5.08 18.79 5.97
Construction & Industry 22.32 3.70 19.16 5.62 26.81 5.61 – – 21.18 4.62
Office & Services 23.23 6.86 23.10 7.01 – – – – – –
Community Services 17.89 4.33 16.86 6.10 – – – – 17.47 5.65
Other 14.77 3.42 14.82 3.16 20.67 6.29 19.05 5.25 15.08 3.48
Women
Agriculture – – – – – – – – – –
Construction & Industry – – – – – – – – – –
Office & Services 21.76 5.31 22.01 6.07 – – – – – –
Community Services 18.11 3.07 18.34 3.43 22.65 10.48 19.49 7.69 18.28 3.97
Other 15.83 5.01 16.63 3.81 – – – – 15.40 5.52
East Germany
Men
Agriculture 17.02 2.17 17.53 5.23 17.46 3.18 17.53 5.80 16.86 3.26
Construction & Industry 16.65 4.02 – – 15.73 3.76 18.11 7.98 16.20 5.74
Office & Services 25.43 5.72 27.60 7.93 – – – – 26.19 7.52
Community Services 16.24 4.13 18.29 3.76 17.30 5.17 – – 16.36 4.97
Other 11.55 3.05 17.11 4.01 11.54 3.74 13.44 6.15 11.44 3.52
Women
Agriculture 18.10 2.14 16.95 5.23 17.92 2.92 17.45 5.27 18.25 3.02
Construction & Industry 13.11 5.74 – – 14.17 6.10 – – 14.66 8.25
Office & Services 17.62 3.02 18.18 9.94 17.13 4.70 18.13 9.47 17.50 4.10
Community Services 11.81 1.58 13.46 2.37 10.77 3.20 13.86 3.83 11.58 2.05
Other 11.03 2.73 13.11 3.68 12.05 2.75 13.77 3.87 10.87 3.31
1 Groups of less than 100 participants are excluded from estimation.
For the further groups differentiated by type of promotion and implementing institution, it can
be seen that the propensity score specification is able to reduce the MSB after matching for most
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groups, too. However, there are some groups for which the MSB after matching is still quite high.
For example, women with enforced promotion in the sector Community Services in West Germany
have a MSB after matching of 10.48%. This highlights the fact that it is not always possible to find
comparable individuals in the group of nonparticipants and that the matching approach is limited in
such situations. Fortunately, this is only the case for very few of the groups in analysis, but has to
be considered when interpreting the results.
A final thing to bear in mind when implementing matching is the region of common support
between participants and nonparticipants. Clearly, matching estimates are only defined over the
common support region and treated individuals who fall outside this region have to be discarded. If
the share of individuals lost is high, the effects have to be re-interpreted which might cause problems
for the explanatory power of the results. Table A.9 in the appendix shows the number of lost
treated individuals due to missing common support. For men in West Germany we lose between zero
(Construction and Industry) and 1.53% (Office and Services) of all treated individuals,
which corresponds to a total loss of ten participants. For women in West Germany we lose seven
observations and the numbers in East Germany are even lower with four men and five women. The
picture is equally good for the further groups defined by different providers and types of promotion.11
Hence, common support is guaranteed and not a problem for this analysis.
6 Sectoral Employment Effects
6.1 Gender and Regions
Let us start with the main effects in the different sectors, which are depicted in table 2. To allow
a more accurate discussion, we present the results for six selected months only. The results over
time, i.e. from February 2000 until December 2002, can be found in figures A.1 and A.2 in the
11 One exception are women in West Germany participating in Community Services with enforced promotion.
For this group we lose 14.6% of the observations. This corresponds to the finding regarding the MSB in this group and
basically permits a further interpretation of the results in this group.
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appendix. The results show that the expected locking-in effects vary considerably not only between
the different sectors but also in both regions. Five month after programmes start in July 2000, we
find significant negative employment effects for men in West Germany which lie between -15.6%
(Agriculture) and -27.2% (Community Services). That means, that the average employment
rate of male participants in the sector Community Services is 27.2% lower compared to matched
nonparticipants. Clearly, this strong reduction is expected as nearly all participants are still in the
programmes, whereas nonparticipants have the chance to search, apply for and find a new job. For
women in West Germany, the effects in July 2000 lie between -19.3% (Community Services) and
-22.9% (Office and Services).
The locking-in effects in East Germany are less pronounced, which may indicate that being locked
into the programme does not have as much influence, since the chances of nonparticipants to find a
new job are lower anyway. For men the effects are bounded between -13.3% (Community Services)
and -19.5% (Construction and Industry). The locking-in effects for women in East Germany
are even lower and lie between -8.7% (Agriculture) and -12.9% (Construction and Industry).
Most of the participants leave the programmes after one year. In fact, in March 2001 around 80%
(74%) of the male (female) participants in West Germany and approximately 91% (92%) of the male
(female) participants in East Germany have left the programmes. Hence, any locking-in effect should
start to fade away after that time, which is also reflected by our findings. In July 2001, the effects
for all of the groups in both regions have increased, even though they are still significantly negative.
The improvement is stronger in West Germany, where the effects for men now lie between -7.7%
(Agriculture) and -15.5% (Office and Services) and for women between -11.3% (Community
Services) and -12.9% (Other). In contrast to that, the improvement in East Germany is smaller but
still visible leading to effects for men between -9.9% (Other) and -13.8% (Community Services)
and for women between -6.0% (Community Services) and -10.4% (Construction and Indus-
try). Even though this is a remarkable development, the crucial question remains if programme
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Tab. 2: Sectoral Employment Effects for Selected Months1
West Germany
Men
Jul 00 Dec 00 Jul 01 Dec 01 Jul 02 Dec 02
Effect -0.1561 -0.0892 -0.0772 -0.0223 -0.0309 0.0086
Agriculture
S.E. 0.0160 0.0166 0.0202 0.0245 0.0268 0.0256
Effect -0.2318 -0.1833 -0.1321 -0.0108 0.0000 0.0243
Construction and Industry
S.E. 0.0204 0.0232 0.0300 0.0338 0.0360 0.0330
Effect -0.2016 -0.2016 -0.1550 -0.0853 0.0930 0.1008
Office and Services
S.E. 0.0323 0.0315 0.0384 0.0384 0.0465 0.0486
Effect -0.2722 -0.2057 -0.1203 -0.0886 -0.0190 -0.0032
Community Services
S.E. 0.0317 0.0299 0.0333 0.0332 0.0314 0.0334
Effect -0.1956 -0.1669 -0.1094 -0.0725 -0.0027 0.0027
Other
S.E. 0.0163 0.0187 0.0232 0.0236 0.0246 0.0235
Women
Effect – – – – – –
Agriculture
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect – – – – – –
Construction and Industry
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect -0.2289 -0.2438 -0.1144 -0.0647 0.0498 0.0796
Office and Services
S.E. 0.0289 0.0333 0.0480 0.0434 0.0448 0.0482
Effect -0.1932 -0.2173 -0.1127 -0.0865 -0.0020 0.0362
Community Services
S.E. 0.0171 0.0234 0.0270 0.0283 0.0315 0.0273
Effect -0.2000 -0.2185 -0.1296 -0.0926 -0.0037 0.0444
Other
S.E. 0.0249 0.0292 0.0337 0.0391 0.0423 0.0447
East Germany
Men
Effect -0.1427 -0.0984 -0.1146 -0.0605 -0.0714 -0.0216
Agriculture
S.E. 0.0123 0.0124 0.0140 0.0148 0.0161 0.0148
Effect -0.1947 -0.1370 -0.1298 -0.0769 -0.0841 -0.0601
Construction and Industry
S.E. 0.0173 0.0230 0.0237 0.0244 0.0217 0.0238
Effect -0.1343 -0.1343 -0.1144 -0.0746 -0.0249 0.0199
Office and Services
S.E. 0.0181 0.0240 0.0334 0.0343 0.0378 0.0360
Effect -0.1327 -0.1425 -0.1376 -0.0860 -0.0467 -0.0319
Community Services
S.E. 0.0218 0.0185 0.0255 0.0253 0.0279 0.0203
Effect -0.1401 -0.1205 -0.0989 -0.0639 -0.0649 -0.0340
Other
S.E. 0.0105 0.0113 0.0139 0.0138 0.0149 0.0164
Women
Effect -0.0873 -0.0782 -0.0711 -0.0650 -0.0376 -0.0183
Agriculture
S.E. 0.0084 0.0094 0.0125 0.0126 0.0121 0.0144
Effect -0.1295 -0.0984 -0.1036 -0.0207 -0.0415 0.0104
Construction and Industry
S.E. 0.0233 0.0229 0.0310 0.0286 0.0320 0.0311
Effect -0.0916 -0.0916 -0.0652 -0.0807 -0.0575 -0.0497
Office and Services
S.E. 0.0102 0.0106 0.0174 0.0173 0.0184 0.0174
Effect -0.0867 -0.0912 -0.0602 -0.0343 -0.0133 0.0232
Community Services
S.E. 0.0063 0.0075 0.0107 0.0118 0.0126 0.0111
Effect -0.1001 -0.1023 -0.0851 -0.0601 -0.0572 -0.0258
Other
S.E. 0.0087 0.0066 0.0105 0.0105 0.0111 0.0131
Bold letters indicate significance on a 1% level, italic letters refer to the 5% level, standard
errors are bootstrapped with 50 replications.
Results refer to NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02.
1 Groups of less than 100 participants are excluded from estimation.
participants have a higher employment rate at the end of our observation period in December 2002.
Unfortunately, this is only true for men in West Germany who participate in the sector Office
and Services (10.1%) and for women in East Germany participating in the sector Community
Services (2.3%). These are the only groups who benefit from participation in terms of a higher
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employment rate. For all other groups we find insignificant or negative effects. In particular we find
negative effects for men in East Germany participating in the sectors Construction and Industry
(-6.0%) and Other (-3.4%) as well as for East German women in Office and Services (-5.0%)
and Other (-2.6%). Taken together, the results are rather discouraging and confirm our previous
empirical findings. Participation in JCS does not increase the employment chances of individuals in
most cases and has therefore to be rated as a failure. What is left to examine is if we can establish
positive effects for the two different types of promotion (regular and enforced) and for the two
different providers (public and non-commercial). We will do so in the following.
6.2 Gender, Regions and Type of Promotion
Tables 3 (West Germany) and 4 (East Germany) contain the results in the different sectors differen-
tiated by the type of promotion.12 As discussed already, there are two types of promotion, namely
regular and enforced. They major difference between both lies in a higher and longer paid
subsidy for enforced promoted occupations in JCS. As a further aspect of enforced promotion is a
higher degree of ‘need for assistance’, it is a priori unclear, what effects are to be expected. On the
one hand it may be argued, that enforced promotion may lead to better outcomes, since the costs
are usually higher and the programme is more intense. On the other hand, it may also be claimed
that those individuals have on average worse labour market prospects.
Taking the results in July 2000 as an indicator for the magnitude of locking-in effects, an unex-
pected finding emerges. We would have expected that an enforced promotion corresponds to higher
locking-in effects. However, in West Germany, this expectation could only be confirmed for men in
Agriculture (-16.7% in regular, -20.5% in enforced promotion). For women in West Germany
no strong statements are possible, since we cannot estimate effects for most of the sub-groups due to
the small number of observations. In East Germany, the hypothesis is confirmed for two male groups
12 Groups of less than 100 observations have been excluded from evaluation. The results over time for the five sectors
and the types of promotion are available on request by the authors.
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Tab. 3: Sectoral Employment Effects by Type of Promotion - Selected
Months (West Germany)1
West Germany
Men
Sector Type of Jul 00 Dec 00 Jul 01 Dec 01 Jul 02 Dec 02
Promotion
Effect -0.1675 -0.1414 -0.1126 -0.0707 -0.0471 -0.0366
Regular
S.E. 0.0208 0.0233 0.0279 0.0254 0.0278 0.0278
Agriculture
Effect -0.2050 -0.1550 -0.1100 -0.0400 -0.0400 -0.0050
Enforced
S.E. 0.0317 0.0332 0.0461 0.0469 0.0404 0.0382
Effect -0.2607 -0.2308 -0.1709 -0.0940 -0.0684 -0.0299
Regular
S.E. 0.0370 0.0291 0.0407 0.0360 0.0366 0.0376
Construction and Industry
Effect -0.2482 -0.1752 -0.0803 0.0000 -0.0365 0.0365
Enforced
S.E. 0.0397 0.0491 0.0566 0.0543 0.0496 0.0516
Effect -0.1520 -0.1680 -0.0960 -0.0320 0.0800 0.1360
Regular
S.E. 0.0381 0.0373 0.0501 0.0470 0.0643 0.0643
Office and Services
Effect – – – – – –
Enforced
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect -0.2018 -0.1881 -0.0688 -0.0780 0.0183 0.0275
Regular
S.E. 0.0320 0.0357 0.0365 0.0422 0.0396 0.0385
Community Services
Effect – – – – – –
Enforced
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect -0.2231 -0.1865 -0.0981 -0.0481 -0.0288 -0.0038
Regular
S.E. 0.0199 0.0189 0.0250 0.0326 0.0285 0.0301
Other
Effect -0.2115 -0.1538 -0.0962 -0.0913 -0.0721 -0.0288
Enforced
S.E. 0.0344 0.0384 0.0431 0.0410 0.0415 0.0400
Women
Effect – – – – – –
Regular
S.E. – – – – – –
Agriculture
Effect – – – – – –
Enforced
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect – – – – – –
Regular
S.E. – – – – – –
Construction and Industry
Effect – – – – – –
Enforced
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect -0.2067 -0.1732 -0.0726 -0.0112 0.1061 0.1117
Regular
S.E. 0.0300 0.0358 0.0546 0.0570 0.0557 0.0581
Office and Services
Effect – – – – – –
Enforced
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect -0.2183 -0.2264 -0.1617 -0.1321 -0.0270 -0.0108
Regular
S.E. 0.0237 0.0246 0.0315 0.0327 0.0343 0.0339
Community Services
Effect -0.2252 -0.1982 -0.1261 -0.0541 0.0450 0.1261
Enforced
S.E. 0.0401 0.0407 0.0555 0.0536 0.0572 0.0553
Effect -0.2067 -0.1875 -0.1058 -0.0144 0.0817 0.1202
Regular
S.E. 0.0251 0.0356 0.0410 0.0393 0.0404 0.0499
Other
Effect – – – – – –
Enforced
S.E. – – – – – –
Bold letters indicate significance on a 1% level, italic letters refer to the 5% level. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with 50 replications.
Results refer to NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02.
1 Groups of less than 100 participants are excluded from estimation.
(and rejected for one) and for three female groups (again, rejected for one). However, the differences
are not very pronounced and do no not allow a clear confirmation of the hypothesis.
Let us now look at the effects in more detail, starting with the effects for West Germany. Table
3 shows that the positive effect for men in Office and Services is confirmed and even higher for
men in regular promotion. The employment rate of these men is 13.6% higher than the one from the
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Tab. 4: Sectoral Employment Effects by Type of Promotion - Selected
Months (East Germany)1
East Germany
Men
Sector Type of Jul 00 Dec 00 Jul 01 Dec 01 Jul 02 Dec 02
Promotion
Effect -0.1384 -0.1071 -0.1250 -0.0804 -0.0759 -0.0536
Regular
S.E. 0.0210 0.0221 0.0255 0.0216 0.0269 0.0255
Agriculture
Effect -0.1626 -0.0927 -0.1127 -0.0599 -0.0728 -0.0300
Enforced
S.E. 0.0113 0.0133 0.0172 0.0167 0.0184 0.0193
Effect – – – – – –
Regular
S.E. – – – – – –
Construction and Industry
Effect -0.1786 -0.1161 -0.1280 -0.0655 -0.0595 -0.0387
Enforced
S.E. 0.0173 0.0217 0.0282 0.0236 0.0303 0.0254
Effect -0.1182 -0.1273 -0.0636 -0.0273 0.0364 0.0818
Regular
S.E. 0.0331 0.0375 0.0425 0.0463 0.0443 0.0473
Office and Services
Effect – – – – – –
Enforced
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect -0.1573 -0.1331 -0.1250 -0.1331 -0.0927 -0.0645
Regular
S.E. 0.0231 0.0243 0.0270 0.0230 0.0285 0.0289
Community Services
Effect -0.1118 -0.1242 -0.0932 -0.0311 -0.0062 -0.0559
Enforced
S.E. 0.0315 0.0288 0.0397 0.0439 0.0473 0.0451
Effect -0.1078 -0.0929 -0.1190 -0.0632 -0.0335 0.0149
Regular
S.E. 0.0218 0.0209 0.0295 0.0247 0.0302 0.0233
Other
Effect -0.1439 -0.1254 -0.0954 -0.0670 -0.0570 -0.0157
Enforced
S.E. 0.0143 0.0147 0.0213 0.0163 0.0186 0.0161
Women
Effect -0.0785 -0.0579 -0.0579 -0.0620 -0.0496 -0.0165
Regular
S.E. 0.0181 0.0199 0.0248 0.0226 0.0291 0.0261
Agriculture
Effect -0.0861 -0.0888 -0.0848 -0.0740 -0.0458 -0.0350
Enforced
S.E. 0.0099 0.0122 0.0135 0.0132 0.0142 0.0139
Effect – – – – – –
Regular
S.E. – – – – – –
Construction and Industry
Effect -0.1103 -0.0966 -0.0759 -0.0483 -0.0483 -0.0552
Enforced
S.E. 0.0320 0.0270 0.0334 0.0379 0.0360 0.0334
Effect -0.0852 -0.0877 -0.0602 -0.0576 -0.0326 -0.0251
Regular
S.E. 0.0159 0.0168 0.0226 0.0224 0.0255 0.0241
Office and Services
Effect -0.1423 -0.1301 -0.0772 -0.0569 -0.0447 -0.0163
Enforced
S.E. 0.0240 0.0212 0.0278 0.0256 0.0290 0.0299
Effect -0.0808 -0.0927 -0.0459 -0.0331 -0.0165 0.0294
Regular
S.E. 0.0078 0.0097 0.0137 0.0127 0.0147 0.0151
Community Services
Effect -0.0847 -0.0889 -0.0569 -0.0139 0.0056 0.0250
Enforced
S.E. 0.0112 0.0114 0.0127 0.0169 0.0207 0.0178
Effect -0.0794 -0.0967 -0.0846 -0.0829 -0.0535 -0.0328
Regular
S.E. 0.0112 0.0112 0.0182 0.0185 0.0191 0.0220
Other
Effect -0.0732 -0.0610 -0.0646 -0.0415 -0.0268 -0.0024
Enforced
S.E. 0.0117 0.0101 0.0147 0.0119 0.0154 0.0145
Bold letters indicate significance on a 1% level, italic letters refer to the 5% level. Standard errors are
bootstrapped with 50 replications.
Results refer to NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02.
1 Groups of less than 100 participants are excluded from estimation.
matched nonparticipants. It is also quite interesting to note that the differentiation between regular
and enforced promotion for women in Community Services leads to positive effects. The effect
for the whole group has been positive but insignificant, and is now 12.6% for enforced promotion
and insignificant for women in regular promotion. However, what should be kept in mind is that
the MSB for this group after matching was quite high and we additionally lost a significant share of
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participants due to missing common support. Hence, the interpretation of the results for this group
is strongly restricted. Positive effects could not be established for any of the groups in East Germany
(table 4). In contrary, we find negative effects for men in Agriculture (-5.4%) and Community
Services (-6.5%) who receive regular promotion. For women we find only one significant effect,
namely -3.5% for participants in enforced promotion in Agriculture. Hence, we can give no clear
recommendation on which type of promotion should be preferred. There are only two groups with
positive effects anyway. For the first group (men in Office and Services in West Germany) we
can only estimate the effects of regular promotion, since the number of participants in enforced
promotion is too small. For the second group (women in Community Services), the findings should
not be overemphasised since the matching indicators (MSB and number of treated individuals lost
due to common support) are not favourable. However, for most of the groups participation in JCS
has no effect at all.
6.3 Gender, Regions and Providers
Tables 5 (West Germany) and 6 (East Germany) contain the results in the programme sectors
differentiated by the implementing institution.13 We have presented already that there are three
types of providers, namely institutions from the public sector, non-commercial organisations and
private businesses. Since the number of participants in private businesses is very small, we had to
exclude this group from the analysis. Additionally, especially in West Germany the differentiation
between providers leads to group classes below 100 observations, such that we can estimate the effects
only for three female and six male groups. In East Germany this is not so problematic and we exclude
only three out of 20 groups.
Turning to the results in West Germany shows, that there are no clear differences with respect
to locking-in effects in the first months. For example men in Agriculture in the public sector
13 The results over time for the five sectors and the types of provider are available on request by the authors.
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Tab. 5: Sectoral Employment Effects by Type of Provider - Selected
Months (West Germany)1
West Germany
Men
Sector Provider Jul 00 Dec 00 Jul 01 Dec 01 Jul 02 Dec 02
Effect -0.1976 -0.1108 -0.1138 -0.0659 -0.0449 -0.0120
Public
S.E. 0.0228 0.0218 0.0239 0.0258 0.0297 0.0228
Agriculture
Effect -0.1849 -0.1681 -0.0840 -0.0378 0.0168 0.0294
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0316 0.0308 0.0337 0.0373 0.0363 0.0325
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Construction and Industry
Effect -0.1932 -0.1818 -0.1023 -0.0379 -0.0455 -0.0076
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0274 0.0264 0.0365 0.0328 0.0356 0.0363
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Office and Services
Effect – – – – – –
Non-Commercial
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Community Services
Effect -0.2283 -0.2165 -0.1496 -0.1024 -0.0472 0.0197
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0302 0.0329 0.0380 0.0373 0.0383 0.0362
Effect -0.2189 -0.1990 -0.1592 -0.1343 -0.0945 -0.0348
Public
S.E. 0.0365 0.0360 0.0377 0.0366 0.0377 0.0359
Other
Effect -0.2047 -0.1599 -0.0981 -0.0661 -0.0235 0.0043
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0215 0.0263 0.0252 0.0256 0.0297 0.0309
Women
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Agriculture
Effect – – – – – –
Non-Commercial
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Construction and Industry
Effect – – – – – –
Non-Commercial
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Office and Services
Effect – – – – – –
Non-Commercial
S.E. – – – – – –
Effect -0.1984 -0.1984 -0.1429 -0.0635 -0.0079 -0.0079
Public
S.E. 0.0411 0.0395 0.0446 0.0484 0.0593 0.0564
Community Services
Effect -0.2099 -0.2431 -0.1160 -0.0939 0.0138 0.0442
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0200 0.0247 0.0297 0.0326 0.0304 0.0318
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Other
Effect -0.1937 -0.2304 -0.1257 -0.0785 0.0000 0.0105
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0249 0.0355 0.0424 0.0430 0.0455 0.0454
Bold letters indicate significance on a 1% level, italic letters refer to the 5% level. Standard errors are boot-
strapped with 50 replications.
Results refer to NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02.
1 Groups of less than 100 participants are excluded from estimation.
have an effect of -19.8% in July 2000, whereas those participating in a programme provided by a
Non-commercial institution have an effect of -18.5% in the same month. The same relation also
holds for participants in the sector Other. For women in Community Services on the other
hand the relation is the other way around, with -19.8% in the public sector and -21.0% in the
non-commercial sector. One year later in July 2001, that is nearly four months after most of
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Tab. 6: Sectoral Employment Effects by Type of Provider - Selected
Months (East Germany) 1
West Germany
Men
Sector Provider Jul 00 Dec 00 Jul 01 Dec 01 Jul 02 Dec 02
Effect -0.1475 -0.1079 -0.1403 -0.0827 -0.0432 -0.0180
Public
S.E. 0.0222 0.0201 0.0260 0.0196 0.0229 0.0243
Agriculture
Effect -0.1246 -0.0902 -0.0918 -0.0689 -0.0754 -0.0525
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0141 0.0133 0.0176 0.0158 0.0153 0.0141
Effect -0.1556 -0.1667 -0.1000 -0.0667 -0.0500 -0.0611
Public
S.E. 0.0290 0.0261 0.0377 0.0393 0.0326 0.0319
Construction and Industry
Effect -0.1827 -0.1154 -0.1538 -0.0913 -0.0721 -0.0433
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0289 0.0287 0.0368 0.0307 0.0358 0.0286
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Office and Services
Effect -0.1290 -0.1048 -0.1290 -0.0645 0.0161 0.0484
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0354 0.0325 0.0393 0.0373 0.0519 0.0453
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Community Services
Effect -0.1524 -0.1494 -0.1128 -0.0976 -0.0488 -0.0122
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0221 0.0178 0.0246 0.0274 0.0209 0.0268
Effect -0.1719 -0.0990 -0.1146 -0.0990 -0.0573 -0.0260
Public
S.E. 0.0286 0.0273 0.0338 0.0312 0.0338 0.0299
Other
Effect -0.1434 -0.1298 -0.0943 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0055
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0144 0.0106 0.0156 0.0178 0.0167 0.0139
Women
Effect -0.0818 -0.0881 -0.0597 -0.0723 -0.0377 -0.0314
Public
S.E. 0.0155 0.0161 0.0217 0.0170 0.0213 0.0204
Agriculture
Effect -0.0866 -0.0677 -0.0772 -0.0409 -0.0252 -0.0142
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0116 0.0091 0.0171 0.0153 0.0187 0.0157
Effect – – – – – –
Public
S.E. – – – – – –
Construction and Industry
Effect -0.1157 -0.0579 -0.0579 0.0165 -0.0165 0.0165
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0292 0.0274 0.0357 0.0375 0.0375 0.0373
Effect -0.0939 -0.0903 -0.0614 -0.0614 -0.0578 -0.0181
Public
S.E. 0.0135 0.0169 0.0283 0.0252 0.0270 0.0271
Office and Services
Effect -0.1145 -0.1205 -0.0663 -0.0512 -0.0120 -0.0181
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0171 0.0164 0.0245 0.0219 0.0265 0.0227
Effect -0.0880 -0.1129 -0.0745 -0.0474 -0.0451 -0.0316
Public
S.E. 0.0121 0.0134 0.0219 0.0232 0.0272 0.0250
Community Services
Effect -0.0984 -0.1037 -0.0689 -0.0386 -0.0182 0.0144
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0081 0.0092 0.0127 0.0132 0.0119 0.0137
Effect -0.1000 -0.0938 -0.0688 -0.0531 -0.0313 0.0000
Public
S.E. 0.0163 0.0168 0.0212 0.0231 0.0234 0.0204
Other
Effect -0.1032 -0.0942 -0.0862 -0.0581 -0.0481 -0.0381
Non-Commercial
S.E. 0.0091 0.0096 0.0132 0.0133 0.0153 0.0153
Bold letters indicate significance on a 1% level, italic letters refer to the 5% level. Standard errors are bootstrapped
with 50 replications.
Results refer to NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02.
1 Groups of less than 100 participants are excluded from estimation.
the participants have left the programmes, the effects are still significantly negative for all of the
groups ranging for men from -9.8% (Other provided by non-commercial institution) to -15.9%
(Other provided by public institution) and for women from -11.6% (Community Services, non-
commercial provider) to -14.3% (Community Services, public provider). After that point in
time, the effects start to move against zero, which leads to no significant effects at all in December
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2002. That means, that participation in JCS neither harms nor helps individuals in terms of a higher
employment rate in December 2002.
The situation in East Germany is different but unfortunately not better. The locking-in effects
are much smaller and range from -12.5% (Agriculture, non-commercial provider) to -18.3%
(Construction and Industry, non-commercial provider) for men and -8.2% (Agriculture,
public provider) to -11.6% (Construction and Industry, non-commercial provider) for women.
In July 2001 the effects are, similar to West Germany, still significantly negative for most of the
groups, but on a slightly lower level. There is also a further improvement in the following months
leading to insignificant effects in December 2002. However, we find significant negative effects for men
in the sector Agriculture provided by Non-commercial institutions (-5.3%) and for women in
Other provided by Non-commercial institutions (-3.8%). That means, that participation in JCS
either harms or does not influence the participants in East Germany in terms of a higher employment
rate in December 2002.
7 Conclusions
JCS have been a major ALMP programme in Germany in the 1990s and the early 2000s. They are
implemented in different sectors of the economy (e.g.Agriculture, Construction and Industry
or Office and Services), by different service providers (for example Public or Non-commercial
institutions) and there are also two types of promotion. Furthermore, the unemployed workers
promoted by these programmes do also differ with respect to their individual employability. For
these reasons, effect heterogeneity is an important topic for programme evaluation. Identifying
effect heterogeneity on the one hand can help to improve the design and implementation of future
programmes, but requires rich data on the other hand. As we can use data from administrative
sources of the FEA, we are able to include information on more than 11,000 participants and nearly
230,000 nonparticipants in our analysis.
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Whereas in Caliendo, Hujer, and Thomsen (2005a) we have analysed the employment effects
of JCS on the participants with respect to group-specific and regional heterogeneity, we focus here
explicitly on effect heterogeneity caused by differences in the implementation of the programmes. We
are able to evaluate the employment effects of participants for nearly three years after programmes
have started. The descriptive analysis of participants and nonparticipants showed several notable
differences between sectors, but also between gender and regions, that were accounted for in the
estimation of the effects. The analysis has been done separately for men and women in West and
East Germany and differentiated by sectors, providers and types of promotion.
The overall findings are rather disappointing. Although we find positive employment effects at
the end of our observation period in December 2002 for some groups, i.e. men in West Germany in
Office and Services and women in East Germany in Community Services, for all other groups
the programmes do not have any effect or even harm the employment chances of the participants.
In East Germany for example, men participating in the sectors Construction and Industry and
Other as well as women in Office and Services and Other experience a loss of employability.
The results for the other aspects in consideration (type of provider, type of promotion) are similar.
Furthermore, the results show that participation in JCS is associated with strong locking-in effects
during the time of the programmes. Although this finding is not surprising as JCS are some kind of
work, it maybe a major source of the unsatisfying programme effects for almost all groups.
Our findings are consistent with previous empirical findings and confirm that JCS are in general
not able to improve the re-integration probability into regular employment for participating unem-
ployed persons. However, we have also shown that the programmes work in some settings. Hence, a
clear policy recommendation is to address programmes more tightly to problem groups of the labour
market and thereby reduce the number of participants. Given that, programmes should also be
designed more specifically in accordance with the needs of the participants.
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Appendix
Tab. A.1: Selected Descriptives for Men in West Germany
Variables
Non-
part.
Agricul. Constr.
and In-
dustry
Office
and
Services
Comm.
Services
Other
Number of observations 44095 584 371 131 320 734
Programme Duration (in days) 261.5 279.1 336.7 285.2 277.1
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 43.22 39.02 35.01 42.65 34.98 36.88
Married 0.52 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.30 0.34
Number of children 0.41 0.51 0.44 0.41 0.38 0.39
Health restrictions
No health restrictions 0.68 0.74 0.81 0.58 0.76 0.74
Acc. DoR, 80% and over 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.15 0.07 0.06
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.00
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis. 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.02
Other health restrictions 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.15
Rehabilitation attendant 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.04
Placement restrictions 0.22 0.16 0.14 0.22 0.16 0.18
Qualification Variables
Professional Training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE 0.15 0.34 0.31 0.07 0.18 0.24
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.34 0.36 0.44 0.15 0.34 0.38
Industrial training 0.44 0.27 0.24 0.47 0.30 0.31
Full-time vocational school 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01
Technical school 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.10 0.04 0.01
Polytechnic 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.01
College, university 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.03
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.04 0.03 0.06
Mining, mineral extraction 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Manufacturing 0.48 0.52 0.67 0.17 0.41 0.56
Technical professions 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.03
Service professions 0.41 0.28 0.20 0.63 0.50 0.33
Other professions 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.03
Professional Rank
Unskilled worker 0.24 0.45 0.39 0.11 0.18 0.28
Skilled worker 0.15 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.09
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.05
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.19 0.06 0.03
Other 0.49 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.55
Qualification (with work experience) 0.93 0.92 0.88 0.84 0.84 0.85
Career Variables
Duration last employment 72.08 16.71 18.57 27.14 18.97 20.51
Duration of unemployment
< 13 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.18 0.30 0.28
13− 52 0.32 0.33 0.37 0.31 0.38 0.34
> 52 0.41 0.45 0.35 0.51 0.32 0.38
Number of placement propositions 3.60 8.17 6.87 9.23 7.08 7.74
Last contact to job center 2.54 2.27 2.38 2.97 2.49 2.61
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme 0.90 0.69 0.66 0.66 0.78 0.74
Further education compl., cont. education 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.09
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
Job-preparative measure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Job creation scheme 0.02 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.13 0.15
Rehabilitation measure 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.01
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II 0.40 0.37 0.61 0.31 0.23 0.37
Cluster III 0.37 0.47 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.36
Cluster IV 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.16 0.11
Cluster V 0.15 0.10 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.16
1 DoR = degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certificate for secondary education
36
Tab. A.2: Selected Descriptives for Women in West Germany
Variables
Non-
part.
Agricul. Constr.
and In-
dustry
Office
and
Services
Comm.
Services
Other
Number of observations 34227 202 503 270
Programme Duration (in days) 307.2 305.1 310.7
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 43.33 39.93 38.00 36.92
Married 0.63 0.50 0.40 0.36
Number of children 0.58 0.62 0.65 0.47
Health restrictions
No health restrictions 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.79
Acc. DoR, 80% and over 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.06
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis. 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01
Other health restrictions 0.18 0.08 0.12 0.11
Rehabilitation attendant 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.05
Placement restrictions 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.13
Qualification Variables
Professional Training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.11
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.39 0.29 0.37 0.41
Industrial training 0.42 0.46 0.29 0.30
Full-time vocational school 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
Technical school 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03
Polytechnic 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.04
College, university 0.02 0.13 0.07 0.08
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
Mining, mineral extraction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Manufacturing 0.24 0.03 0.10 0.26
Technical professions 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.03
Service professions 0.71 0.89 0.88 0.66
Other professions 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02
Professional Rank
Unskilled worker 0.17 0.05 0.15 0.15
Skilled worker 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.18 0.27 0.20 0.13
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.07
Other 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.61
Qualification (with work experience) 0.93 0.84 0.86 0.85
Career Variables
Duration last employment 64.12 32.98 24.82 21.09
Duration of unemployment
< 13 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.25
13− 52 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.36
> 52 0.42 0.38 0.39 0.40
Number of placement propositions 2.99 8.08 6.42 6.80
Last contact to job center 2.40 2.57 2.69 2.29
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme 0.91 0.57 0.67 0.74
Further education compl., cont. education 0.07 0.20 0.11 0.10
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
Job-preparative measure 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Job creation scheme 0.01 0.18 0.20 0.15
Rehabilitation measure 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II 0.34 0.23 0.35 0.34
Cluster III 0.41 0.47 0.38 0.38
Cluster IV 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.08
Cluster V 0.16 0.23 0.18 0.20
1 DoR = degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certificate for secondary education
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Tab. A.3: Selected Descriptives for Men in East Germany
Variables
Non-
part.
Agricul. Constr.
and In-
dustry
Office
and
Services
Comm.
Services
Other
Number of observations 64788 925 416 202 410 971
Programme Duration (in days) 325.0 273.5 332.1 324.3 327.1
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 41.73 46.02 43.13 48.87 42.83 43.47
Married 0.48 0.54 0.51 0.73 0.58 0.50
Number of children 0.36 0.42 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.37
Health restrictions
No health restrictions 0.75 0.79 0.81 0.75 0.69 0.77
Acc. DoR, 80% and over 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.04
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis. 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
Other health restrictions 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.11 0.20 0.17
Rehabilitation attendant 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.15 0.08
Placement restrictions 0.16 0.11 0.09 0.14 0.20 0.14
Qualification Variables
Professional Training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.07
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.11 0.18 0.24
Industrial training 0.69 0.64 0.70 0.41 0.60 0.57
Full-time vocational school 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Technical school 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.07 0.06
Polytechnic 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01
College, university 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.04
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.05 0.13 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.04
Mining, mineral extraction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Manufacturing 0.53 0.56 0.72 0.13 0.42 0.53
Technical professions 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.34 0.09 0.06
Service professions 0.33 0.27 0.20 0.50 0.46 0.35
Other professions 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01
Professional Rank
Unskilled worker 0.22 0.38 0.34 0.15 0.22 0.28
Skilled worker 0.29 0.20 0.23 0.15 0.21 0.19
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.07 0.06
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.04 0.01
Other 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.47 0.45 0.46
Qualification (with work experience) 0.89 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.84 0.89
Career Variables
Duration last employment 55.51 25.38 19.53 28.04 18.35 26.52
Duration of unemployment
< 13 0.34 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.20
13− 52 0.35 0.38 0.42 0.47 0.48 0.44
> 52 0.31 0.44 0.38 0.34 0.29 0.36
Number of placement propositions 3.01 5.41 6.86 7.08 6.35 6.01
Last contact to job center 2.79 2.59 2.41 2.71 2.65 2.47
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme 0.83 0.49 0.51 0.46 0.49 0.60
Further education compl., cont. education 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.28 0.13 0.12
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.04
Job-preparative measure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Job creation scheme 0.05 0.32 0.26 0.21 0.29 0.22
Rehabilitation measure 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia 0.22 0.35 0.15 0.24 0.11 0.22
Cluster Ib 0.65 0.52 0.62 0.68 0.74 0.66
Cluster Ic 0.11 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.12 0.07
Cluster II 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.05
1 DoR = degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certificate for secondary education
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Tab. A.4: Selected Descriptives for Women in East Germany
Variables
Non-
part.
Agricul. Constr.
and In-
dustry
Office
and
Services
Comm.
Services
Other
Number of observations 76512 986 193 645 1810 1401
Programme Duration (in days) 322.2 289.5 337.9 336.6 340.7
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 44.01 43.37 43.09 45.23 44.27 43.16
Married 0.64 0.67 0.65 0.75 0.70 0.62
Number of children 0.67 0.89 0.87 0.74 0.75 0.80
Health restrictions
No health restrictions 0.80 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.85
Acc. DoR, 80% and over 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis. 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
Other health restrictions 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.12
Rehabilitation attendant 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03
Placement restrictions 0.12 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.08
Qualification Variables
Professional Training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE 0.05 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.03
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 0.21 0.23 0.17 0.12 0.18 0.20
Industrial training 0.66 0.64 0.69 0.62 0.63 0.61
Full-time vocational school 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02
Technical school 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.14 0.12 0.10
Polytechnic 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.01
College, university 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.03
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.05 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.03 0.05
Mining, mineral extraction 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Manufacturing 0.20 0.31 0.30 0.03 0.14 0.22
Technical professions 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.07
Service professions 0.70 0.46 0.52 0.84 0.79 0.66
Other professions 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Professional Rank
Unskilled worker 0.21 0.40 0.41 0.12 0.21 0.23
Skilled worker 0.16 0.11 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.14
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.13 0.12
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02
Other 0.53 0.46 0.39 0.53 0.48 0.49
Qualification (with work experience) 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.92 0.90 0.89
Career Variables
Duration last employment 63.44 25.10 24.89 37.54 33.54 30.07
Duration of unemployment
< 13 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.10 0.13
13− 52 0.35 0.33 0.37 0.42 0.42 0.39
> 52 0.49 0.58 0.46 0.45 0.48 0.48
Number of placement propositions 2.77 4.67 5.40 6.10 5.57 5.44
Last contact to job center 2.78 2.57 2.45 2.54 2.58 2.65
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme 0.72 0.42 0.49 0.34 0.42 0.47
Further education compl., cont. education 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.34 0.25 0.22
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04
Job-preparative measure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Job creation scheme 0.08 0.33 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27
Rehabilitation measure 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia 0.23 0.35 0.30 0.17 0.19 0.27
Cluster Ib 0.65 0.53 0.60 0.69 0.70 0.64
Cluster Ic 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.07
Cluster II 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
1 DoR = degree of restriction
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certificate for secondary education
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Tab. A.5: Estimation Results of the Logit Models for the Propensity Score
for Men in West Germany
Agricul. Constr.
and In-
dustry
Office
and
Services
Comm.
Services
Other
Constant -4.5090 -2.0459 -14.7072 -1.9766 -1.4588
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.0296 -0.1343 0.3791 -0.1129 -0.0903
Age2 -0.0004 0.0012 -0.0046 0.0008 0.0008
Married -0.1962 0.2334 -0.2226 -0.2582 -0.2198
Number of children 0.0821 0.0138 0.0544 0.1037 0.0470
German 0.4813 0.7739 0.3909 0.3824 0.2198
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 1.0175 -0.1815 2.6592 0.9154 0.8374
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.6903 -0.2525 2.1295 1.0849 0.7921
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 1.2822 – 2.2650 1.6448 1.0191
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.4658 -0.1619 1.5272 0.2676 -0.0430
Other health restrictions 0.0007 -0.5748 0.3054 -0.0625 0.0104
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.4973 -0.2519 0.0767 -0.1785 -0.2244
Industrial training -0.8328 -0.9076 0.7825 -0.4150 -0.6079
Full-time vocational school -2.2360 -0.7638 0.5245 0.1831 -0.8342
Technical school -0.6101 -1.9566 1.8069 0.8077 -0.3926
Polytechnic -1.1617 -1.2058 1.5514 1.5481 0.2834
College, University -1.2767 -1.6570 1.5608 1.1832 0.3560
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.7547 -0.2927 0.5320 -0.5022 -0.2250
Mining, mineral extraction -0.1697 -0.2687 – – -1.0362
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -1.1560 -0.3301 1.1658 -0.9419 -0.6920
Service professions -0.3911 -0.9058 0.8755 0.2073 -0.3893
Other professions 0.1087 -0.0414 – 0.0509 0.1483
Professional rank
Unskilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Skilled worker -0.9516 -0.6308 -0.1782 -0.2041 -0.2274
White-collar worker, simple occupations -0.9201 -0.3070 0.9784 0.7277 0.1837
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.4016 -0.9263 1.2236 0.6425 0.2038
Other -0.3683 -0.1285 0.4315 0.5479 0.1596
Qualification (with work experience) -0.1010 -0.0272 -0.6922 -0.3797 -0.5170
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0060 -0.0037 -0.0045 -0.0042 -0.0042
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.3618 0.1339 0.1228 0.1566 0.0478
More than 52 weeks 0.4661 0.1087 0.2744 0.1279 0.1306
Number of placement propositions 0.0488 0.0390 0.0548 0.0422 0.0509
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0868 -0.0427 0.1005 0.0370 0.0481
Rehabilitation attendant -0.1213 0.3637 0.0981 0.0664 -0.6723
Placement restrictions -0.5594 0.1139 -0.9824 -0.2758 -0.0975
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.2545 0.4914 0.3483 0.0440 0.1234
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.7916 1.3185 0.0651 – 0.7083
Job-preparative measure – – – – 0.4281
Job creation scheme 1.8566 2.3925 2.2831 2.1205 2.1139
Rehabilitation measure -0.3244 -0.3238 0.2913 -1.3737 0.2296
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II 0.0350 0.8558 -1.0783 -1.2007 -0.3589
Cluster III 0.3023 0.0440 -0.6491 -0.5698 -0.2780
Cluster IV -0.0778 -0.5322 -0.9304 0.0819 0.1881
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Number of Observations 44657 44283 43097 43907 44829
Log-Likelihood -2641.6 -1788.1 -690.5 -1630.7 -3325.6
R-2 0.151 0.166 0.224 0.139 0.112
F-Test 942.6 711.1 399.1 526.1 841.3
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR = degree of restriction.
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certificate for secondary education
4 Cluster according to the classification by Blien et al. (2004).
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Tab. A.6: Estimation Results of the Logit Models for the Propensity Score
for Women in West Germany
Agricul. Constr.
and In-
dustry
Office
and
Services
Comm.
Services
Other
Constant -10.8847 -4.0484 -2.8853
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.1432 -0.0184 -0.0337
Age2 -0.0020 -0.0001 0.0000
Married -0.0555 -0.4877 -0.5266
Number of children -0.0584 0.0991 -0.1484
German 0.2172 0.2534 0.0660
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 1.6533 1.2490 1.1843
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 1.2609 0.1901 0.8155
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% 2.6829 1.6893 1.9266
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.1754 0.0613 -0.1396
Other health restrictions -0.5043 0.0392 -0.1831
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE 1.4281 0.2030 0.1662
Industrial training 1.4096 -0.1961 -0.1883
Full-time vocational school 1.2480 0.0993 -0.3989
Technical school 1.2967 1.0363 0.2617
Polytechnic 1.9382 1.7607 1.0906
College, University 2.6014 0.7199 0.9856
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery – -0.3153 0.1718
Mining, mineral extraction – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions 2.1652 -1.5239 -0.2572
Service professions 1.7365 0.7999 -0.3822
Other professions 2.7255 0.3314 -0.2270
Professional rank
Unskilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref.
Skilled worker 0.3798 -0.3085 -0.1599
White-collar worker, simple occupations 0.9857 0.0576 -0.0256
White-collar worker, advanced occupations 0.6057 0.6116 0.5002
Other 0.6401 -0.0642 0.3818
Qualification (with work experience) -0.5613 -0.2914 -0.2246
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0011 -0.0036 -0.0052
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks -0.0406 0.1764 -0.0637
More than 52 weeks -0.1897 0.1289 0.0470
Number of placement propositions 0.0639 0.0405 0.0519
Last contact to job center (weeks) 0.0715 0.0868 -0.0107
Rehabilitation attendant -0.2866 0.0587 0.4787
Placement restrictions -0.2261 -0.2235 -0.4517
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 1.0745 0.4635 0.1449
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.8883 0.2137 0.7757
Job-preparative measure – 3.0067 1.9089
Job creation scheme 3.2762 3.0801 2.6577
Rehabilitation measure 2.4833 0.4374 0.1713
Regional Context Variables
Cluster II -1.1530 -0.4614 -0.4831
Cluster III -0.4413 -0.4805 -0.4413
Cluster IV -0.9771 -0.3191 -0.3983
Cluster V Ref. Ref. Ref.
Number of Observations 33808 34722 34489
Log-Likelihood -978.6 -2155.6 -1366.9
Adj. R2 0.208 0.180 0.134
F -Test 514.1 947.4 423.0
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR = degree of restriction.
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certificate for secondary education
4 Cluster according to the classification by Blien et al. (2004).
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Tab. A.7: Estimation Results of the Logit Models for the Propensity Score
for Men in East Germany
Agricul. Constr.
and In-
dustry
Office
and
Services
Comm.
Services
Other
Constant -8.2748 -9.5586 -13.5752 -7.7192 -5.8072
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.1404 0.1422 0.2537 0.0405 0.0536
Age2 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0006 -0.0005
Married 0.1750 0.2778 0.7052 0.6680 0.1540
Number of children -0.0003 -0.0185 -0.0923 -0.1112 -0.0355
German 0.9722 0.9294 0.4182 0.2826
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.7313 – 1.0624 0.9844 0.3286
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% 0.1230 0.3058 1.2961 0.7323 0.4997
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% -0.0321 0.9936 0.8507 0.9713 0.5456
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 0.1819 -0.1677 0.6446 0.1971 -0.6727
Other health restrictions -0.1835 -0.0607 -0.3975 -0.1103 -0.2133
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.1993 0.0082 0.7288 0.5236 0.3536
Industrial training -0.4028 -0.0537 0.6616 0.4050 -0.1207
Full-time vocational school -1.1763 – 0.7572 0.9366 -0.0298
Technical school -0.7256 -0.9740 1.9463 1.0078 0.4512
Polytechnic -1.2676 -0.5647 1.2524 1.2241 0.1479
College, University -1.0406 -2.3433 1.5007 1.2085 0.3227
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.4311 -0.4405 0.7232 -0.6927 -0.4147
Mining, mineral extraction -0.2213 – – – -0.9264
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.5769 -0.7692 2.0272 -0.0203 -0.3332
Service professions -0.3614 -0.8173 1.5137 0.3114 -0.1208
Other professions -0.8095 -2.5447 – -1.1155 -1.1386
Professional rank
Unskilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Skilled worker -0.2621 -0.1943 0.0823 0.1961 -0.2162
White-collar worker, simple occupations -0.5796 -0.0050 0.8196 0.6719 0.3583
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.4724 0.0520 0.1988 0.8298 -0.6402
Other -0.0491 -0.0736 0.1469 0.3534 0.0624
Qualification (with work experience) 0.0340 0.0726 -0.5968 -0.5560 -0.2526
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0033 -0.0046 -0.0047 -0.0058 -0.0032
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.4516 0.5849 0.2067 0.2123 0.4993
More than 52 weeks 0.6017 0.6374 -0.1582 -0.1864 0.4252
Number of placement propositions 0.0478 0.0563 0.0865 0.0599 0.0619
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.1348 -0.1612 -0.0797 -0.0580 -0.1404
Rehabilitation attendant -0.0539 0.1741 0.1138 0.8264 0.2646
Placement restrictions -0.3779 -0.6037 -0.3717 -0.1578 -0.2246
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.5840 0.5980 1.1618 0.5393 0.2033
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.7988 0.7730 0.2532 1.0237 0.3476
Job-preparative measure – 2.0179 – 2.0594 0.0596
Job creation scheme 1.7722 1.7151 1.6850 2.2508 1.4818
Rehabilitation measure – 0.3156 1.4364 0.2399 0.6264
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Cluster Ib -0.7175 0.2881 -0.3000 0.6637 -0.0922
Cluster Ic -0.4215 0.9103 -0.7914 0.5424 -0.6073
Cluster II -1.8884 0.8778 – 0.6829 0.7615
Number of Observations 65143 64363 60196 65020 65759
Log-Likelihood -4171.0 -2196.1 -1050.4 -2154.7 -4612.0
R-2 0.141 0.126 0.223 0.133 0.088
F-Test 1365.7 631.7 604.1 662.5 886.0
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR = degree of restriction.
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certificate for secondary education
4 Cluster according to the classification by Blien et al. (2004).
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Tab. A.8: Estimation Results of the Logit Models for the Propensity Score
for Women in East Germany
Agricul. Constr.
and In-
dustry
Office
and
Services
Comm.
Services
Other
Constant -8.3115 -7.3101 -17.9453 -11.0899 -7.4834
Socio-Demographic Variables
Age 0.1646 0.1095 0.2713 0.1896 0.1357
Age2 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0030 -0.0021 -0.0016
Married 0.1734 0.0965 0.3118 0.1677 -0.0951
Number of children -0.0079 0.0391 -0.0247 -0.0443 -0.0068
German 1.2282 0.1296 0.9727 0.9592 0.2932
Health restrictions
No health restrictions Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Acc. DoR1, 80% and over 0.5151 1.3060 0.4847 1.2810 1.3117
Acc. DoR, 50% to under 80% -0.4661 – 1.4311 0.5698 0.5660
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50% -0.0995 0.6024 1.0580 0.9809 0.7660
Acc. DoR, 30% to under 50%, no equalis.2 -0.4257 – -0.1513 0.3423 -0.7409
Other health restrictions -0.3801 -0.0696 0.0203 -0.1429 -0.0935
Qualification Variables
Professional training
Without compl. prof. training, no CSE Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Without compl. prof. training, with CSE -0.1973 -0.7454 2.8098 1.1480 0.4957
Industrial training -0.2955 -0.4954 3.1291 1.1850 0.3712
Full-time vocational school -0.1436 -0.5663 3.5078 1.9609 0.7458
Technical school -1.0249 -1.0713 3.8222 2.0607 1.1572
Polytechnic 0.1174 – 4.2966 1.8746 0.8370
College, University -0.6146 – 4.1203 1.6008 1.1025
Occupational group
Plant cultivation, breeding, fishery 0.7666 0.5567 0.8609 -0.4426 -0.3304
Mining, mineral extraction – – – – –
Manufacturing Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Technical professions -0.1984 -0.0814 2.1028 -0.0027 0.3317
Service professions -0.6008 -0.4644 1.7419 0.4004 -0.2090
Other professions -2.1141 – – -0.8522 -0.9722
Professional rank
Unskilled worker Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Skilled worker -0.3874 -0.3283 0.7162 0.2401 0.1468
White-collar worker, simple occupations -1.1101 -0.7485 0.8690 0.3714 0.5205
White-collar worker, advanced occupations -0.6226 – 0.7576 0.0554 -0.0237
Other -0.0863 -0.4287 0.6151 0.1320 0.2311
Qualification (with work experience) -0.0233 0.2537 0.0397 -0.1753 -0.2035
Career Variables
Duration of last employment (months) -0.0038 -0.0036 -0.0018 -0.0025 -0.0032
Duration of unemployment (weeks)
Up to 13 weeks Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Between 13 and 52 weeks 0.1846 -0.1683 0.0900 0.4047 0.1262
More than 52 weeks 0.4296 -0.3131 -0.1725 0.2016 0.0354
Number of placement propositions 0.0720 0.0945 0.0871 0.0844 0.0883
Last contact to job center (weeks) -0.0903 -0.1270 -0.0665 -0.0624 -0.0412
Rehabilitation attendant -0.3401 0.4405 0.1995 0.3138 0.0668
Placement restrictions -0.3940 -0.3174 -0.6241 -0.1234 -0.2779
Programme before unemployment
No further education or programme Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Further education compl., cont. education 0.3164 0.1885 1.0771 0.6341 0.3466
Further education compl., voc. adjustment 0.7365 0.8097 0.8346 0.5587 0.3103
Job-preparative measure 0.7493 – – 1.1397 –
Job creation scheme 1.3215 1.1128 2.0433 1.6684 1.4558
Rehabilitation measure 0.7830 – 0.5727 0.4027 0.1661
Regional Context Variables
Cluster Ia Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Cluster Ib -0.6175 -0.3887 0.1607 0.1800 -0.3009
Cluster Ic -0.4307 -0.5747 0.2994 -0.0548 -0.8413
Cluster II -2.9446 -0.2383 -0.6426 0.4739 -0.0499
Number of Observations 77456 70413 75868 78280 77777
Log-Likelihood -4602.3 -1224.2 -3112.0 -7635.1 -6387.1
R-2 0.129 0.080 0.163 0.113 0.089
F-Test 1360.2 214.3 1210.6 1944.0 1257.2
Bold letters indicate significance at the 1% level. Italic letters refer to the 5% level.
1 DoR = degree of restriction.
2 People with accepted degree of restriction, but no equalisation to other persons with the same DoR.
3 CSE = Certificate for secondary education
4 Cluster according to the classification by Blien et al. (2004).
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Tab. A.9: Number of Treated Individuals Lost Due to Common Support1
Agriculture Construction and
Industry
Office and Services Community Services Other
Before After Lost Before After Lost Before After Lost Before After Lost Before After Lost
Matching in % Matching in % Matching in % Matching in % Matching in %
West Germany - Men 584 583 0.17 371 371 0.00 131 129 1.53 320 316 1.25 734 731 0.41
Provider
Public 335 334 0.30 – – – – – – – – – 203 201 0.99
Non-Commercial 238 238 0.00 265 264 0.38 – – – 255 254 0.39 471 469 0.42
Type of Promotion
Regular 382 382 0.00 234 234 0.00 126 125 0.79 220 218 0.91 522 520 0.38
Enforced 202 200 0.99 137 137 0.00 – – – – – – 212 208 1.89
West Germany - Women – – – – – – 202 201 0.50 503 497 1.19 270 270 0.00
Provider
Public – – – – – – – – – 130 126 3.08 – – –
Non-Commercial – – – – – – – – – 367 362 1.36 191 191 0.00
Type of Promotion
Regular – – – – – – 181 179 1.10 373 371 0.54 208 208 0.00
Enforced – – – – – – – – – 130 111 14.62 – – –
East Germany - Men 925 925 0.00 416 416 0.00 202 201 0.50 410 407 0.73 971 971 0.00
Provider
Public 278 278 0.00 182 180 1.10 – – – – – – 192 192 0.00
Non-Commercial 610 610 0.00 208 208 0.00 125 124 0.80 331 328 0.91 732 732 0.00
Type of Promotion
Regular 224 224 0.00 – – – 112 110 1.79 249 248 0.40 269 269 0.00
Enforced 701 701 0.00 336 336 0.00 – – – 161 161 0.00 702 702 0.00
East Germany - Women 986 985 0.10 193 193 0.00 645 644 0.16 1810 1810 0.00 1401 1398 0.21
Provider
Public 318 318 0.00 – – – 277 277 0.00 443 443 0.00 320 320 0.00
Non-Commercial 635 635 0.00 121 121 0.00 333 332 0.30 1322 1321 0.08 1000 998 0.20
Type of Promotion
Regular 243 242 0.41 – – – 399 399 0.00 1089 1089 0.00 581 579 0.34
Enforced 743 743 0.00 145 145 0.00 246 246 0.00 721 720 0.14 820 820 0.00
1 Results refer to a NN matching without replacement and a caliper of 0.02.
– Groups with less than 100 participants are omitted.
Fig. A.1: Sectoral Employment Effects in West Germany (February 2000 - December 2002)1,2,3
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1 Solid line describes the monthly employment effect. Dotted lines are the upper and lower 95% confidence limits.
2 Month 2 refers to February 2000, month 12 = December 2000, month 24 = December 2001, month 36 = December 2002.
3 Effects for groups with less than 100 participants are omitted.
Fig. A.2: Sectoral Employment Effects in East Germany (February 2000 - December 2002)1,2,3
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1 Solid line describes the monthly employment effect. Dotted lines are the upper and lower 95% confidence limits.
2 Month 2 refers to February 2000, month 12 = December 2000, month 24 = December 2001, month 36 = December 2002.
3 Effects for groups with less than 100 participants are omitted.
IABDiscussionPaper No. 13/2005   49
In dieser Reihe sind zuletzt erschienen 
Recently published 
No. Author(s) Title Date 
1/2004 Bauer, Th. K., 
Bender, St.,  
Bonin, H. 
Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in 
Small Establishments 
7/2004 
2/2004 Achatz, J.,  
Gartner, H., 
Glück, T. 
Bonus oder Bias? Mechanismen geschlechts-
spezifischer Entlohnung 
7/2004 
3/2004 Andrews, M., 
Schank, Th., 
Upward, R. 
Practical estimation methods for linked  
employer-employee data 
8/2004 
4/2004 Brixy, U.,  
Kohaut, S., 
Schnabel; C. 
Do newly founded firms pay lower wages? 
First evidence from Germany 
9/2004 
5/2004 Kölling, A, 
Rässler, S. 
Editing and multiply imputing German estab-
lishment panel data to estimate stochastic  
production frontier models 
10/2004 
6/2004 Stephan, G, 
Gerlach, K. 
Collective Contracts, Wages and Wage  
Dispersion in a Multi-Level Model 
10/2004 
7/2004 Gartner, H. 
Stephan, G. 
How Collective Contracts and Works Councils 
Reduce the Gender Wage Gap 
12/2004 
    
1/2005 Blien, U.,  
Suedekum, J. 
Local Economic Structure and Industry 
Development in Germany, 1993-2001 
1/2005 
2/2005 Brixy, U., 
Kohaut, S., 
Schnabel, C. 
How fast do newly founded firms mature? 
Empirical analyses on job quality in start-ups 
1/2005 
3/2005 Lechner, M., 
Miquel, R., 
Wunsch, C. 
Long-Run Effects of Public Sector Sponsored 
Training in West Germany 
1/2005 
4/2005 Hinz, Th., 
Gartner, H. 
Lohnunterschiede zwischen Frauen und  
Männern in Branchen, Berufen und Betrieben 
2/2005 
5/2005 Gartner, H., 
Rässler, S. 
Analyzing the Changing Gender Wage Gap 
based on Multiply Imputed Right Censored 
Wages 
3/2005 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 13/2005   50
6/2005 Alda, H., 
Bender, S., 
Gartner, H. 
The linked employer-employee dataset of the 
IAB (LIAB) 
3/2005 
7/2005 Haas, A., 
Rothe, Th. 
Labour market dynamics from a regional  
perspective 
The multi-account system 
4/2005 
8/2005 Caliendo, M., 
Hujer, R., 
Thomsen, S.L. 
Identifying Effect Heterogeneity to Improve 
the Efficiency of Job Creation Schemes in 
Germany 
4/2005 
9/2005 Gerlach, K., 
Stephan, G. 
Wage Distributions by Wage-Setting Regime 4/2005 
10/2005 Gerlach, K., 
Stephan, G. 
Individual Tenure and Collective Contracts 4/2005 
11/2005 Blien, U., 
Hirschenauer, 
F. 
Formula allocation: The regional allocation of 
budgetary funds for measures of active labour 
market policy in Germany 
4/2005 
12/2005 Alda, H., 
Allaart, P., 
Bellmann, L. 
Churning and institutions – Dutch and German 
establishments compared with micro-level 
data 
5/2005 
    
 
 
IABDiscussionPaper No. 13/2005  51 
 
Impressum 
 
 IABDiscussionPaper 
No. 13 / 2005 
 
Herausgeber 
Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung 
der Bundesagentur für Arbeit 
Weddigenstr. 20-22 
D-90478 Nürnberg 
 
Redaktion 
Regina Stoll, Jutta Palm-Nowak 
 
Technische Herstellung 
Jutta Sebald 
 
 
Rechte 
Nachdruck – auch auszugsweise – nur mit 
Genehmigung des IAB gestattet  
 
Bezugsmöglichkeit 
Volltext-Download dieses DiscussionPaper 
unter: 
http://doku.iab.de/discussionpapers/2005/dp1305.pdf
 
IAB im Internet 
http://www.iab.de 
 
Rückfragen zum Inhalt an 
Reinhard Hujer, Tel. 069/798-28115, 
oder e-Mail: gesine.stephan@iab.de  
 
 
 
